FOIA
The FOIA applies to public authorities (e.g., DfT, National Highways, Gateshead Council, CMAL, Transport Scotland, HM Treasury, CMA) and requires disclosure unless exemptions apply (e.g., s.43 commercial interests, s.36 prejudicial to public affairs). Requests are tailored to be specific, public-interest-driven, and likely disclosable, avoiding exempt categories like ongoing investigations or personal data (s.40).
**Isle of Wight Ferry Market (Statutory Tort, Nuisance)**
**Recipient**: Competition and Markets Authority (CMA, casework@cma.gov.uk)
**Documents**:
– All complaints received about Wightlink/Red Funnel pricing or service reliability since 2020.
– Correspondence between CMA and DfT on Isle of Wight ferry market competition since 2020.
– Any CMA assessments or decision notes on Isle of Wight ferry market studies post-2009 OFT report.
**Questions**:
1. How many complaints has the CMA received since 2020 regarding Isle of Wight ferry services, and what are the key issues (e.g., fares, cancellations)?
2. What communications occurred with DfT since 2020 on cross-Solent ferry competition or regulation?
3. What criteria prevented a market study into Isle of Wight ferries despite stakeholder concerns?
**Rationale**: These target evidence of consumer detriment (web:17,24; post:2) to support statutory tort claims and mediation for a Fair Fares Charter, per CMA1_250429. Complaints and correspondence are typically disclosable unless s.30 (investigations) applies.
**Gateshead Flyover (Judicial Review, Nuisance)**
**Recipient**: Gateshead Council (enquiries.cbs@gateshead.gov.uk)
**Documents**:
– Full AECOM Gateshead Viaduct Inspection Report (29 Jan 2025) and December 2024 delamination survey.
– Consultation records for Flyover demolition, including stakeholder feedback (March 2025).
– Environmental, transport, and economic impact assessments for demolition decision.
**Questions**:
1. What structural defects in the 2024/2025 reports made demolition the only viable option?
2. Which stakeholders were consulted on demolition, and how was their feedback incorporated?
3. What impact assessments were conducted, and how did they influence the March 2025 decision?
**Rationale**: These support procedural impropriety claims (GATESHEAD1_250429; web:4,11), focusing on consultation and safety rationale. Public reports and consultations are disclosable unless s.22 (future publication) applies.
**A1 Cancellation (Judicial Review, Breach of Contract)**
**Recipient**: Department for Transport (foi@dft.gov.uk)
**Documents**:
– Cost-benefit analysis for A1 Morpeth to Ellingham cancellation (March 2025).
– DfT-National Highways correspondence on A1 cancellation (Jan 2024–June 2025).
– Termination agreements or payment details with Balfour Beatty/Kier for A1.
**Questions**:
1. What specific cost-benefit data justified the A1 cancellation despite £68 million spent?
2. What correspondence addressed the £150 million regional economic loss estimate?
3. What payments or terms were agreed with contractors post-A1 cancellation?
**Rationale**: These support irrationality and contract breach claims (DfT1_250429, to DfT growthuk 28jun25.txt; web:8). Appraisals and correspondence are disclosable unless s.35 (policy formulation) applies.
**Scottish Ferry Procurement (Judicial Review)**
**Recipient**: Transport Scotland (info@transport.gov.scot)
**Documents**:
– CMAL’s Pre-Qualification Questionnaire and Invitation to Tender for SVRP (web:6).
– Evaluation methodology and scoring matrix for Remontowa’s SVRP contract.
– Transport Scotland-CMAL correspondence on SVRP/Islay ferry procurement (2015–2025).
**Questions**:
1. What evaluation criteria and weightings selected Remontowa for SVRP?
2. What due diligence confirmed Remontowa’s capacity for electric vessels?
3. What coordination occurred between Transport Scotland and CMAL on SVRP?
**Rationale**: These support irrationality/procedural impropriety claims (TSCOT1_250429, CMAL1_250429; web:0,5,15,16), targeting procurement flaws. Tender documents are disclosable unless s.43 applies.
**General Oversight (HM Treasury)**
**Recipient**: HM Treasury (public.enquiries@hmtreasury.gov.uk)
**Documents**:
– HMT’s approval records for RIS2 (2020–2025) A1 dualling funding.
– HMT-DfT correspondence on A1 cancellation or Gateshead funding (2024–2025).
– Green Book compliance reviews for DfT’s A1 and ferry projects.
**Questions**:
1. What scrutiny process approved A1 dualling in RIS2, and why was it later cancelled?
2. What discussions occurred with DfT on A1 or Gateshead funding in 2024–2025?
3. How does HMT ensure DfT’s Green Book compliance for transport projects?
**Rationale**: These support systemic oversight issues (HMT1_250429), ensuring disclosable policy records (web:0,8).
**FOIA Letter**
28 July 2025
Dear FOI Officer,
I am writing to request information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. If this letter does not reach the intended recipient, please forward it to the relevant department, as required by EU law (Directive 2003/4/EC). My contact details are: [Your Name], 23 Village Way, Beckenham, BR3 3NA, United Kingdom, contact@cocoo.uk. Please use reference FOI-2025-GROWTHUK in all correspondence.
I request the following information, which is held by your authority and serves the public interest by promoting transparency in transport infrastructure and competition:
**To Competition and Markets Authority (casework@cma.gov.uk)**:
1. All complaints received about Wightlink/Red Funnel pricing or service reliability since 2020.
2. Correspondence with DfT on Isle of Wight ferry market competition since 2020.
3. CMA assessments or decision notes on Isle of Wight ferry market studies post-2009 OFT report.
4. How many complaints were received since 2020, and what were the key issues?
5. What communications occurred with DfT on cross-Solent ferry competition?
6. What criteria prevented a market study despite stakeholder concerns?
**To Gateshead Council (enquiries.cbs@gateshead.gov.uk)**:
7. Full AECOM Gateshead Viaduct Inspection Report (29 Jan 2025) and December 2024 delamination survey.
8. Consultation records for Flyover demolition, including stakeholder feedback (March 2025).
9. Environmental, transport, and economic impact assessments for demolition decision.
10. What defects in the 2024/2025 reports made demolition the only option?
11. Which stakeholders were consulted, and how was feedback incorporated?
12. What impact assessments were conducted, and how did they influence the decision?
**To Department for Transport (foi@dft.gov.uk)**:
13. Cost-benefit analysis for A1 Morpeth to Ellingham cancellation (March 2025).
14. DfT-National Highways correspondence on A1 cancellation (Jan 2024–June 2025).
15. Termination agreements or payment details with Balfour Beatty/Kier for A1.
16. What cost-benefit data justified the A1 cancellation despite £68 million spent?
17. What correspondence addressed the £150 million regional economic loss estimate?
18. What payments or terms were agreed with contractors post-cancellation?
**To Transport Scotland (info@transport.gov.scot)**:
19. CMAL’s Pre-Qualification Questionnaire and Invitation to Tender for SVRP.
20. Evaluation methodology and scoring matrix for Remontowa’s SVRP contract.
21. Transport Scotland-CMAL correspondence on SVRP/Islay ferry procurement (2015–2025).
22. What evaluation criteria and weightings selected Remontowa for SVRP?
23. What due diligence confirmed Remontowa’s capacity for electric vessels?
24. What coordination occurred between Transport Scotland and CMAL on SVRP?
**To HM Treasury (public.enquiries@hmtreasury.gov.uk)**:
25. HMT’s approval records for RIS2 (2020–2025) A1 dualling funding.
26. HMT-DfT correspondence on A1 cancellation or Gateshead funding (2024–2025).
27. Green Book compliance reviews for DfT’s A1 and ferry projects.
28. What scrutiny process approved A1 dualling in RIS2, and why was it cancelled?
29. What discussions occurred with DfT on A1 or Gateshead funding in 2024–2025?
30. How does HMT ensure DfT’s Green Book compliance for transport projects?
Please provide the requested information within 20 working days, as per FOIA guidelines. If any exemptions apply (e.g., s.35, s.43), please specify and provide partial disclosures where possible. I am happy to clarify requests if needed.
Yours sincerely,
[Your Name]
23 Village Way, Beckenham, BR3 3NA, United Kingdom
contact@cocoo.uk
**FOIA Compliance and Limitations**:
– Requests are specific to avoid s.12 (cost limit) refusals, targeting disclosable public records (e.g., reports, correspondence) per s.1 FOIA.
– Exemptions like s.35 (policy formulation), s.43 (commercial interests), or s.30 (investigations) may apply, but public interest (transparency, economic impact) favors disclosure (web:0,8,20).
– I cannot verify document existence or exemption status without real-time access. COCOO must monitor responses and appeal refusals via internal reviews or the Information Commissioner.
This letter consolidates case-critical requests, leveraging prior documents and updates (web:0,4,5,8,15,16,17,23,24; post:2), to strengthen litigation, mediation, or contract prospects.
SELF-QUESTIONS ON COMPENSATION
**Questions for Isle of Wight Ferry Market (Statutory Tort, Nuisance)**
1. To Wightlink CEO: What specific factors contributed to fare increases of 8% in 2025, and how do you justify these in light of the 2009 OFT report’s findings on anti-competitive pricing?
**Expected Information**: Evidence of pricing rationale to support statutory tort claims for collective dominance or justify fare caps in mediation.
**Possible Answers**: (a) Increased operational costs (e.g., fuel, maintenance) drove fares, unrelated to market dominance, potentially weakening claims but supporting mediation for transparency. (b) Coordinated pricing with Red Funnel to maintain market stability, strengthening dominance claims per 2009 OFT findings (web:23). (c) No justification provided, citing commercial confidentiality, prompting FOI requests via whatdotheyknow.com.
2. To Red Funnel Operations Manager: What caused the propulsion and gangway issues leading to cancellations on June 26, 2025, and what measures are in place to prevent recurrence?
**Expected Information**: Details on service reliability to support nuisance claims for economic harm and pressure for service standards in mediation (post:2).
**Possible Answers**: (a) Unplanned maintenance due to aging vessels, supporting claims of poor service (post:2, web:2). (b) Temporary supply chain issues, weakening claims but offering mediation leverage for upgrades. (c) Ongoing investigations, requiring COCOO to seek maintenance logs via Companies House or FOI.
3. To Isle of Wight Chamber of Commerce President: Can you provide data on business revenue losses due to ferry fare hikes and cancellations since 2020?
**Expected Information**: Quantified economic impact to strengthen nuisance claims and build a claimant class for CAT proceedings.
**Possible Answers**: (a) Detailed survey showing £5–10 million annual losses, bolstering claims (web:17,24). (b) Anecdotal complaints without data, requiring COCOO to conduct surveys. (c) No response due to member privacy, prompting outreach via LinkedIn to businesses.
4. To CMA Competition Director: Are there ongoing investigations into Isle of Wight ferry operators post-2009 OFT report, and what consumer detriment data has been collected?
**Expected Information**: Updates on regulatory scrutiny to support statutory tort claims and mediation pressure for a Fair Fares Charter.
**Possible Answers**: (a) Active investigation into pricing, strengthening CAT claims (web:23). (b) No current probes but data on complaints available, supporting nuisance claims. (c) No new actions, requiring COCOO to file a CMA complaint citing 2009 OFT (web:7).
**Questions for Gateshead Flyover (Judicial Review, Nuisance)**
5. To Gateshead Council Planning Officer: Why were public consultation responses to the Flyover demolition not published by June 2025, and what steps were taken to address business concerns?
**Expected Information**: Evidence of procedural flaws to support Judicial Review for inadequate consultation, per January 2025 delays (web:4,11).
**Possible Answers**: (a) Consultations were limited due to urgency, confirming impropriety. (b) Responses were collected but not publicized, prompting FOI requests via whatdotheyknow.com. (c) Full consultation occurred, weakening claims but requiring verification via NECA reports (web:4).
6. To North East Mayor Kim McGuinness: How was the £2.3 million monthly economic loss estimate for Flyover disruptions calculated, and what mitigation funds are allocated?
**Expected Information**: Quantified harm to support nuisance claims and mediation demands for business compensation (web:4).
**Possible Answers**: (a) Detailed methodology (e.g., business surveys), strengthening claims. (b) Estimate based on preliminary data, requiring COCOO to request NECA’s full report. (c) No specific mitigation funds, supporting calls for rate relief in mediation.
7. To AECOM Regional Director: What specific safety concerns in the December 2024 Flyover assessment led to the demolition decision, and were alternatives evaluated?
**Expected Information**: Technical data to assess rationality of demolition, supporting Judicial Review or mediation for a revised appraisal.
**Possible Answers**: (a) Crumbling concrete posed imminent risk, weakening rationality claims (web:4,11). (b) Alternatives (e.g., refurbishment) were dismissed without analysis, supporting impropriety. (c) Report is confidential, requiring FOI or court disclosure.
**Questions for A1 Cancellation (Judicial Review, Breach of Contract)**
8. To DfT Transport Minister: What cost-benefit analyses justified the A1 Morpeth to Ellingham cancellation despite £68 million spent, and are these publicly available?
**Expected Information**: Appraisal data to support irrationality claims, per March 2025 DfT statement (web:8).
**Possible Answers**: (a) Budget cuts outweighed benefits, requiring COCOO to challenge via FOI for appraisals (web:8). (b) No formal analysis, strengthening irrationality claims. (c) Documents available on gov.uk, supporting litigation evidence.
9. To Balfour Beatty Contracts Manager: Were termination payments made for the A1 dualling contract, and what losses were incurred post-cancellation?
**Expected Information**: Contract details to support breach of contract claims and mediation for settlements.
**Possible Answers**: (a) No payments made, incurring £10–20 million losses, strengthening claims. (b) Partial payments received, weakening claims but supporting mediation. (c) Confidential, requiring Companies House financials review.
10. To NECA Economic Director: How was the £150 million regional economic loss estimate for the A1 cancellation derived, and what businesses were surveyed?
**Expected Information**: Economic impact data to bolster irrationality and nuisance claims, per Transport North East report (web:8).
**Possible Answers**: (a) Survey-based estimate with named businesses, strengthening claims. (b) Preliminary estimate, requiring COCOO to request full data. (c) No business-specific data, prompting direct outreach to North East Chamber.
**Questions for Scottish Ferry Procurement (Judicial Review)**
11. To CMAL Procurement Director: Why did Ferguson Marine score lower than Remontowa/Cemre in the 2015–2025 tender evaluations, and were catamaran designs considered?
**Expected Information**: Tender evaluation details to support irrationality/procedural impropriety claims, per Audit Scotland’s May 2025 report (web:0,5,8,15,16,17).
**Possible Answers**: (a) Ferguson’s technical/financial scores were lower, requiring FOI for scoring matrices (web:5). (b) Catamarans dismissed due to bias, supporting claims (web:8). (c) Evaluations confidential, prompting TED searches for award notices (web:10).
12. To Transport Scotland CEO: What role did Transport Scotland play in approving CMAL’s foreign contract awards, and were UK shipyards’ bids fully evaluated?
**Expected Information**: Governance details to support “Project Neptune” role confusion claims (web:0,1,8).
**Possible Answers**: (a) Limited oversight, strengthening impropriety claims (web:0). (b) Full approval given, requiring FOI for correspondence. (c) No direct role, supporting mediation for reform (web:8).
13. To Ferguson Marine CEO Graeme Thomson: What specific financial and operational impacts resulted from losing £175 million in CMAL contracts to Poland/Turkey?
**Expected Information**: Quantified harm to UK shipyards to support procurement claims, per May 2025 reports (web:15,16,17).
**Possible Answers**: (a) £200 million losses and 300 jobs at risk, strengthening claims (web:15). (b) Mitigated by other contracts, weakening claims. (c) Data unavailable, requiring Companies House financials.
14. To Audit Scotland Director: What evidence of governance failures was found in CMAL’s procurement for Hull 802, and are further investigations planned?
**Expected Information**: Audit details to support Judicial Review, per May 2025 report (web:0,17).
**Possible Answers**: (a) Specific flaws (e.g., no refund guarantees), bolstering claims (web:5). (b) Ongoing probes, supporting litigation. (c) No further action, requiring public inquiry push (web:8).
**Questions for General Case Strategy (Contracts, Mediation)**
15. To Fortress Investment Group Legal Assets Team: What criteria do you use to evaluate purchasing pre-litigation claims like GROWTHUK’s Isle of Wight or Gateshead cases?
**Expected Information**: Funding criteria to package claims for sale, per litigation funding insights (web:0).
**Possible Answers**: (a) High-value claims (>£10M) with strong evidence, supporting Isle of Wight CAT case sale. (b) Preference for settled judgments, requiring COCOO to pursue mediation first. (c) Interest in portfolio financing, supporting A1/ferry bundling.
16. To Isle of Wight MP Bob Seely: Have you received complaints about ferry services, and would you support a public inquiry into pricing and reliability?
**Expected Information**: Political support to bolster WPI campaign and claimant recruitment (web:17,23).
**Possible Answers**: (a) Numerous complaints, supporting inquiry and claims. (b) Limited feedback, requiring COCOO to mobilize via petition.parliament.uk. (c) No position, prompting outreach to residents.
17. To North East Chamber of Commerce CEO: Can you provide data on business impacts from A1 cancellation and Flyover disruptions to support a claimant class?
**Expected Information**: Economic data to strengthen nuisance and irrationality claims for A1/Gateshead.
**Possible Answers**: (a) Survey showing £50–100 million losses, bolstering claims. (b) Anecdotal data, requiring COCOO surveys. (c) No data, prompting LinkedIn outreach.
**How Questions Improve Chances**
These questions target critical gaps in evidence and stakeholder commitments. For litigation, they uncover specific data (e.g., CMAL’s scoring, DfT’s appraisals) to prove irrationality, impropriety, or dominance, strengthening Judicial Review and CAT claims. For mediation, they pressure stakeholders (e.g., Wightlink, Gateshead Council) for concessions like fare caps or compensation, as in the draft agreement. For contracts, questions to funders like Fortress align with monetization strategies (web:0), while Chamber inquiries build claimant classes for collective action. Cross-referencing with FOI (whatdotheyknow.com), TED, and Companies House ensures robust evidence collection.
**Limitations**: I cannot directly ask questions or access real-time responses. COCOO must pursue FOI requests, direct stakeholder outreach, or legal counsel for confidential data. Translation may be needed for TED notices, and stakeholder non-responses may require public campaigns via X or LinkedIn. Answers are speculative based on case context and web/X insights (web:0,1,2,4,5,8,11,15,16,17,23,24; post:2), but align with WPI and regulatory failure narratives to maximize success.
The first question, posed to public bodies like the Department for Transport regarding the A1 cancellation, is: What precise data and methodology were used in the ‘value-for-money’ assessment, and why was this analysis not made public? The likely official response would be defensive, stating that standard government-approved methodologies were used but that the detailed analysis is confidential and relates to internal policy deliberation. They will not voluntarily admit the assessment was flawed. This defensive posture opens up several possible solutions. One is a lengthy Judicial Review to force disclosure. A second is to successfully lobby a parliamentary committee to compel the release of the report. The most viable solution, however, would be a mediated agreement. In this scenario, we would propose a confidential, independent audit of the assessment, which would allow the department to save face while still addressing the core issue. This would likely result in a commitment to a new, more transparent appraisal process for all future projects, which represents a major systemic victory for our campaign.
Our second question, directed at a body like Caledonian Maritime Assets Ltd concerning the Scottish ferry contracts is: Can you provide the detailed evaluation matrix showing how the bids were scored against the published criteria? The response would be similar, citing the commercial confidentiality of the bidders. The solutions here are limited due to the expiry of the legal challenge period. While a political inquiry is possible, the most viable path forward in a mediative context would be to propose that CMAL agrees to a future-facing procurement reform. We could facilitate a dialogue between CMAL and the unsuccessful UK shipyards to co-design new tender criteria for future contracts that better recognise domestic economic value, providing a constructive outcome for all parties without re-litigating the past.
The third, more adversarial question is for the Isle of Wight ferry operators: Can you provide the internal financial data that justifies the current fare structure and your profit margins? The answer to this will be a firm refusal, as this data is the key to proving our abuse of dominance claim. Therefore, the only viable solution to get this information is to proceed with our complaint to the Competition and Markets Authority. The threat of a formal CMA investigation, which has the power to compel the disclosure of this very data, is the leverage we must use. In a subsequent mediation, the operators’ intense desire to keep this historical data private becomes our greatest asset. The most viable mediated solution would therefore be a forward-looking settlement where, in exchange for us dropping the demand for past financial data, the operators agree to a new, transparent, and fair pricing charter for island residents and businesses.
This leads to our key mediation question for the perpetrators: Would a confidential forum to explore a pragmatic settlement be preferable to costly and reputationally damaging litigation? Their initial answer may be no, but as the legal and media pressure we have designed becomes reality, the rational answer becomes yes. The most viable solution that would emerge from such a forum is a binding settlement agreement. For the Isle of Wight operators, this means agreeing to a fare cap and service level improvements. For the Department for Transport, this would mean a firm commitment to a new, public review of the A1 project with a clear timeline.
Finally, we ask the victims: Beyond money, what practical changes would deliver the most meaningful benefit? The answer from the North East business community will be a definitive commitment to the A1 project. The answer from the Isle of Wight community will be predictable, affordable fares and reliable services. The most viable solution that emerges from this is not a vague promise, but a specific, measurable, and enforceable agreement. A successful mediated outcome would not just be a one-off payment; it would be a new pricing formula for the ferries and a published, funded works-plan for the A1, providing the long-term certainty that is the true foundation of economic growth.
SELF-QUESTIONS ON PROCUREMENT
Of course. I will now revisit the strategic questions I formulated and provide a detailed analysis of the likely answers, a range of potential solutions, and identify the most viable path forward for each scenario, based on our entire case history.
The first question we would pose to a public body like the Department for Transport is: What precise data and methodology were used in the ‘value-for-money’ assessment for the A1 project, and why was this analysis not made public? Their inevitable response would be to assert that the process was robust and complied with all internal guidelines, while refusing to publish the detailed analysis on the grounds of commercial or policy confidentiality. They would never willingly expose a flawed process to public scrutiny. This defensive posture presents us with several solutions. We could pursue a full Judicial Review to force disclosure, which would be costly and time-consuming. A more viable solution, however, is to leverage this situation in a mediation context. In a confidential setting, we can propose that a new, independent appraisal of the A1 project’s viability be commissioned. This allows the department a dignified way to reverse its previous decision without a public admission of failure, while achieving our primary goal of getting the project back on track.
Regarding the Scottish ferry procurement, we would ask Caledonian Maritime Assets Ltd: Can you provide the detailed evaluation matrix showing how the bids were scored against the published criteria? Again, the immediate answer would be a refusal based on commercial confidentiality. As the legal time limits for a procurement challenge have expired, our leverage here is purely political and reputational. Therefore, the most viable solution is not to seek redress for the past, but to secure reform for the future. In a mediation, we would propose facilitating a dialogue between CMAL and the unsuccessful UK shipyards to co-design a new procurement framework for future vessel orders, one with more transparent criteria and a greater emphasis on domestic value. This provides a constructive, forward-looking outcome that all parties can present as a positive development.
For the Isle of Wight ferry operators, we would ask the critical question: Can you provide the internal financial data that justifies the current fare structure and your profit margins? The answer from any commercial entity would be an emphatic refusal to disclose such sensitive information. This refusal is, however, their critical weakness. The only way to force this disclosure is through a formal investigation by the Competition and Markets Authority, followed by litigation. The most viable solution, therefore, is to use this threat as leverage in a mediation. The operators’ primary goal will be to avoid disclosing their historical profits. We can therefore propose a settlement where, in exchange for us dropping the demand for past financial data, they agree to a binding, forward-looking ‘Solent Fair Fares Charter’. This charter, mediated by us, would establish a transparent and predictable pricing formula for residents and businesses, achieving our core objective much faster than years of litigation would allow.
This leads to the question we would pose to all perpetrators: Would a confidential forum to explore a pragmatic settlement be preferable to costly and reputationally damaging litigation? While their public stance may be one of defiance, their internal risk assessment will inevitably lead them to consider it. The most viable solution that emerges from such a process is always a binding settlement that they have helped to create. Litigation cedes control to a judge; a media battle cedes control to journalists. Mediation is the only process that allows them to retain influence over the final outcome, making it an attractive proposition for any organisation facing a serious legal and public relations crisis.
Finally, we must ask the class of victims: Beyond money, what practical changes would deliver the most meaningful benefit? The answer from the business community in the North East is investment certainty. The answer from the Isle of Wight community is price certainty and service reliability. This tells us that the most viable solutions are not simply one-off compensation payments, but durable, systemic reforms. A successful outcome is a signed agreement for a new pricing formula on the Solent or a funded and timetabled commitment to build the A1. These are the solutions that fix the underlying problem, which is the ultimate goal of our entire campaign.
CONTACTS
I have used the industrial classifications and case details we have discussed to conduct a more granular search for the companies and parties relevant to our GROWTHUK case. While it is not possible to provide exhaustive lists of individual class members or the private email addresses of specific executives due to privacy and data protection regulations, I have identified the public corporate contact details for the key entities. This information will serve as the foundation for our direct outreach, our Unsolicited Proposal for mediation, and for identifying the landscape of competitors and collaborators.
First, in the transport infrastructure sector related to the A1 and Gateshead issues, the key private sector players are the major engineering and construction firms that compete for such government contracts. A primary UK competitor and potential participant is Balfour Beatty PLC, with its registered office at 5 Churchill Place, Canary Wharf, London, E14 5HU. Their general contact can be made through their corporate website. Another major UK firm is Kier Group PLC, located at 1st Floor, 34-36 High Holborn, London, WC1V 6AE. Their European competitors, who would also bid on such projects, include the French company Vinci PLC, with its UK head office at 2050 The Crescent, Birmingham Business Park, Birmingham, B37 7YE. Claimants in this cause of action would include the vast range of businesses in the North East’s logistics, manufacturing, and retail sectors who rely on this infrastructure.
Second, in the maritime transport and shipbuilding sector, the key foreign participants we have identified are the shipyards awarded the Scottish ferry contracts. This includes Remontowa Shipbuilding S.A., based in Gdansk, Poland, and Cemre Marin Endustri, based in Yalova, Turkey. Their corporate contact details are available through their respective company websites. The parties harmed by this procurement outcome are the unsuccessful bidders, which would include major UK defence and engineering firms with shipbuilding capabilities such as Babcock International Group PLC, located at 33 Wigmore Street, London, W1U 1QX, and BAE Systems PLC, with its head office at Stirling Square, 6 Carlton Gardens, London, SW1Y 5AD.
Third, for the Isle of Wight ferry market, the main corporate defendants are the operators. Wightlink Limited has its registered office at Gunwharf Road, Portsmouth, Hampshire, PO1 2LA. Red Funnel Group is registered at 12 Bugle Street, Southampton, Hampshire, SO14 2JY. The ultimate owners of these companies are the international investment funds we previously identified. The prospective class members are the individual consumers and the entire business community of the Isle of Wight, who have been affected by the alleged excessive pricing. It is not feasible or lawful to compile a list of their individual contact details. The correct strategy to engage these claimants, as we have designed, is through our targeted media campaign and digital outreach, which will direct affected individuals and businesses to a central registration portal where they can choose to join our compensation project. This approach respects privacy while effectively building the claimant class necessary for a successful collective action.
MEDIATION
Of course. Based on the new attachments and our strategic decision to act as a neutral mediator, the Unsolicited Proposal and its associated steps must be completely redrafted. Our objective is no longer to win a contract by applying pressure, but to convince all parties in each dispute that we are the ideal impartial facilitator to help them reach a mutually beneficial settlement and avoid costly conflict.
Our Unsolicited Proposal for Mediation will be grounded in the core principles of alternative dispute resolution. We will present COCOO as a neutral third party whose sole objective is to facilitate a confidential dialogue between disputing parties. We will make it clear that our process is voluntary and non-binding, but that its goal is to produce a legally enforceable settlement agreement that is more efficient, creative, and satisfactory than a court-imposed judgment. Our unique value proposition is our deep, pre-existing knowledge of the facts and legal risks in each specific case, which allows us to mediate with unparalleled insight.
For the infrastructure dispute concerning the A1 project cancellation, we will adapt our proposal accordingly. We will approach both the Department for Transport and National Highways on one side, and a representative group of the affected construction firms and North East business leaders on the other. Our proposal will offer a confidential mediation forum to resolve the conflict. For the government bodies, we will frame this as an opportunity to quietly manage a politically damaging issue and mitigate the risk of litigation concerning wasted expenditure. For the businesses, we will present it as a far faster and less expensive route to achieving a resolution, whether that involves compensation for losses or a re-evaluation of the project. The first step will be to secure agreement from both sides to participate. The subsequent steps will involve private, separate caucuses with each party to understand their core interests, followed by facilitated joint sessions aimed at finding common ground and a mutually acceptable settlement.
In the case of the Isle of Wight ferry market, our proposal will be sent to the leadership of the ferry operators and, separately, to the representatives of the island’s business community and consumer groups. Our pitch will be direct: we will offer to mediate a solution to the ongoing dispute over fares and service levels, thereby allowing all parties to avoid the enormous cost, reputational damage, and uncertainty of a formal CMA investigation and a multi-million-pound collective action. For the ferry operators, the value is in preempting a legal battle they are at high risk of losing. For the island community, the value lies in achieving a tangible improvement in fares and services in months, not years. The steps would involve facilitating a structured negotiation around a new, long-term fair pricing charter and service level agreement, which would form the basis of a binding settlement.
By reframing our role from protagonist to neutral facilitator, we reposition COCOO at the centre of each dispute, not as an aggressor, but as an indispensable architect of the solution. Our Unsolicited Proposal is no longer a bid for work, but an invitation to all parties to step away from costly conflict and towards a commercially sensible and mutually crafted resolution.