The documents reveal COCOO’s strategy of positioning itself as a watchdog for competition, consumer rights, and public interest, targeting perceived deficiencies in public sector decision-making and procurement. The concerns span multiple areas: the cancellation or delay of road projects (A1 dualling, Moor Farm roundabout, A66 upgrade), the demolition of the Gateshead Flyover, the Isle of Wight ferry market’s competition issues, and Scottish ferry procurement challenges. Each letter is structured similarly, raising allegations of procedural unfairness, irrationality, or inefficiency, requesting detailed information, and suggesting potential legal risks (e.g., Judicial Review, tortious liability, competition law breaches). The Preliminary Report on Economic Growth provides a legal framework, identifying Judicial Review, tort, contract, and competition law as potential avenues, while highlighting strict time limits and evidentiary challenges.
A critical insight is the time sensitivity of potential legal actions, particularly for Judicial Review, which has a three-month limit (or shorter for procurement and planning decisions). For instance, the A1 cancellation (around January 2025) likely has an expired Judicial Review window (around April 2025), as does the A66 Development Consent Order (six-week limit from March 2024). The Gateshead Flyover demolition decision (March/April 2025) may still be within a six-week or three-month window, but this requires urgent confirmation of the exact decision date. The Scottish ferry procurement challenge faces a 30-day procurement limit, likely expired unless the contract award was very recent. These tight deadlines pose a significant hurdle, limiting viable legal claims unless new, challengeable decisions emerge.
Another insight is the evidentiary gap. COCOO’s letters rely on “prior analysis” (not provided), making it unclear whether sufficient evidence exists to substantiate claims of irrationality, procedural impropriety, or negligence. The Preliminary Report notes the absence of prior regulatory findings (e.g., CMA infringement decisions), meaning any claims would be “standalone,” requiring COCOO to prove wrongdoing, which is resource-intensive. For example, alleging abuse of dominance in the Isle of Wight ferry market needs detailed market share data and evidence of anti-competitive conduct, which COCOO may not yet possess. Similarly, tort claims for negligence (e.g., economic loss from A1 cancellation) face high hurdles due to courts’ reluctance to impose duties of care on public bodies for policy decisions.
The documents also highlight systemic issues—recurring “poor value for money” justifications, delays, and perceived regulatory gaps—suggesting COCOO could position itself as a broader advocate for public sector reform. This opens non-litigation avenues, such as regulatory complaints or public advocacy, which could be more feasible given legal barriers. For instance, the CMA complaint about the Isle of Wight ferries is a strategic move, as a successful investigation could lead to follow-on damages claims, though this depends on CMA discretion and evidence quality.
To win this case, I would pursue a multi-pronged strategy, balancing immediate legal opportunities with longer-term advocacy and revenue generation. First, I would prioritize the Gateshead Flyover case, as it appears the most time-sensitive Judicial Review opportunity. I would urgently confirm the exact date of the March/April 2025 demolition decision to determine if the six-week (planning) or three-month (general) limit remains open. If viable, I would send a Pre-Action Protocol letter to Gateshead Council, alleging procedural impropriety (inadequate consultation) and irrationality (failure to fully assess repair options), demanding the AECOM report and consultation records. This could pressure the Council into releasing information or reconsidering its decision, strengthening COCOO’s position.
For the Isle of Wight ferries, I would formalize a complaint to the CMA, compiling available evidence (e.g., fare data, service disruption records, stakeholder complaints) to argue market dominance and potential abuse (high fares, poor reliability). I would engage local businesses and residents to bolster the complaint, emphasizing consumer detriment. If the CMA launches a market study, COCOO could gain credibility and potentially support affected parties in future damages claims. I would also explore whether COCOO could act as a representative claimant for a collective action if an infringement is found.
For the A1, Moor Farm, and A66 issues, where Judicial Review windows have likely closed, I would shift to non-litigation strategies. I would file Freedom of Information (FOI) requests with National Highways and DfT for business cases, environmental assessments, and consultation records, aiming to uncover procedural flaws or new decisions that could reset the Judicial Review clock. Concurrently, I would engage MPs and local authorities to lobby for project reinstatement, positioning COCOO as a community advocate. For Scottish ferries, I would monitor CMAL’s contract performance and participate in future procurement consultations, as procurement challenges are time-barred.
To make money from this case, I would adopt a hybrid revenue model combining legal fees, consultancy services, and advocacy partnerships. As COCOO’s solicitor, I would charge hourly or fixed fees for legal work, such as drafting Pre-Action letters, CMA complaints, or FOI requests, ensuring costs are proportionate to COCOO’s budget. Given COCOO’s consultancy classification (SIC 70229), I would propose offering paid advisory services to affected stakeholders—local businesses impacted by the Gateshead Flyover demolition or Isle of Wight ferry issues—helping them navigate regulatory complaints or prepare for potential damages claims. This could include market analysis reports or impact assessments, leveraging COCOO’s investigation capabilities (SIC 80300).
I would also explore contingency fee arrangements for high-potential claims, such as a Gateshead Judicial Review or future ferry-related damages, where COCOO’s costs are covered only if the case succeeds, aligning incentives. To amplify revenue, I would seek partnerships with trade associations, chambers of commerce, or community groups, offering COCOO’s expertise in public sector accountability for membership fees or project-based contracts. Publicizing successful outcomes (e.g., CMA investigation or Gateshead concessions) via media and COCOO’s platform could attract clients, enhancing its reputation as a consumer rights champion.
A limitation I face is the lack of primary analysis documents, which hinders assessing the strength of COCOO’s allegations. I would need COCOO to provide these reports or clarify the evidence base. Additionally, I cannot access real-time data (e.g., current project statuses or CMA responses) without web searches, which I’d need COCOO’s approval to conduct. I also need clarification on COCOO’s standing—whether it’s directly affected (e.g., a business impacted by ferry fares) or acting as a public interest entity, as this affects legal eligibility.
In summary, I would focus on the Gateshead Flyover for immediate Judicial Review, push the CMA complaint for the Isle of Wight ferries, and use FOI and advocacy for other issues, while monetizing through fees, consultancy, and partnerships. COCOO must provide primary evidence and confirm its standing to proceed effectively. What specific evidence does COCOO have, and does it prefer litigation or advocacy prioritization?
The new documents provide critical insights into the GROWTHUK case, enhancing our strategic approach by identifying foreign dimensions, prior infringement findings, and specific causes of action, while offering a clear framework for evidence gathering and mediation. The Whistleblower, Public Interest, and Consumer Protection (WPI) strategy, combined with detailed industry classifications and collective action precedents, strengthens our ability to pursue legal, regulatory, and media-driven outcomes. Below, I outline new insights, findings of infringement, possible causes of action, evidence with sources and types, and search strategies to seek further evidence.
The foreign dimensions reveal international stakeholders in all three pillars of the case. For Scottish ferry procurement, the awards to Remontowa Shipbuilding S.A. (Poland) and Cemre Marin Endustri (Turkey) highlight European shipyards (e.g., from Spain, Germany, Netherlands) as harmed parties, potentially strengthening a public law challenge by emphasizing economic impacts on the UK and EU markets. In the Isle of Wight ferry market, foreign ownership by Canadian and international funds (e.g., Workplace Safety & Insurance Board of Ontario, Fiera Infrastructure, Basalt Infrastructure Partners) and potential European competitors (e.g., DFDS, Brittany Ferries, Stena Line) underscore the cross-border economic implications, bolstering our competition law arguments. For North East infrastructure, European construction firms (e.g., Vinci, Bouygues, Skanska, Strabag) affected by cancellations like the A1 dualling add a layer of international commercial interest, supporting claims of procedural unfairness in procurement.
The 2009 Office of Fair Trading (OFT) report on the Isle of Harbour ferry market is a pivotal insight, confirming market features that “prevent, restrict or distort competition” due to high barriers to entry (e.g., control of harbour facilities) but finding insufficient consumer detriment at the time. This provides a foundation to argue that current high fares and poor service constitute realized detriment, justifying a new CMA complaint. The 2023 CMA infringement decision against ten construction firms for bid-rigging in demolition and asbestos removal contracts is another key finding, offering evidence of anti-competitive practices in the UK construction sector. This strengthens our argument that the A1 cancellation’s “poor value for money” justification may be tainted by similar collusion, supporting both Judicial Review and media campaigns. No infringement findings exist for Scottish ferry procurement, confirming our focus on public law challenges rather than competition law.
Possible causes of action include: In public law, Judicial Review against the Department for Transport (DfT) and National Highways for irrationality in cancelling the A1 dualling after £68 million spent, alleging failure to consider economic impacts or bid-rigging risks. Against Gateshead Council, Judicial Review for procedural impropriety (inadequate consultation) and irrationality (insufficient options appraisal) in the flyover demolition decision. Against CMAL, Judicial Review for irrationality and procedural unfairness in ferry procurement, arguing flawed evaluation processes. In competition law, a statutory tort claim against Isle of Wight ferry operators (Red Funnel, Wightlink) for abuse of collective dominant position through excessive pricing and poor service, potentially coupled with conspiracy if collusion evidence emerges. In tort law, negligence claims against public bodies for physical harm (e.g., road accidents due to poor maintenance on A1 or Gateshead Flyover) or private nuisance for businesses/residents near construction sites (e.g., A66, Moor Farm, Gateshead) impacted by excessive disruption. In contract law, breach of contract claims by firms with terminated A1 contracts, arguing unlawful termination due to irrational decisions, and claims against CMAL for voidable contracts if procurement was ultra vires. For Isle of Wight ferry customers, restitution claims for overcharged fares, arguing price terms are unlawful due to anti-competitive conduct.
Evidence includes: The 2009 OFT report (source: OFT archives, type: regulatory report) confirming anti-competitive market features in the Isle of Wight ferry sector. The 2023 CMA infringement decision (source: CMA website, type: regulatory decision) proving bid-rigging in construction, supporting allegations of tainted A1 tenders. Parliamentary records (source: Hansard, type: official statements) detailing A1 cancellation and £68 million expenditure, evidencing irrationality. COCOO’s letters (source: provided documents, type: correspondence) outlining allegations and stakeholder concerns, forming a basis for procedural impropriety claims. Public complaints and media reports (source: local Isle of Wight news, type: anecdotal evidence) documenting high ferry fares and service issues, supporting consumer detriment claims. AECOM Gateshead Viaduct Report (source: Gateshead Council, type: engineering report, not yet obtained) to challenge demolition rationale. A1 and Moor Farm business cases (source: National Highways/DfT, type: appraisal documents, not yet obtained) to scrutinize value-for-money assessments.
Search strategies for evidence include: On Contracts Finder and Find a Tender, search for “A1 dualling Morpeth Ellingham” or “Gateshead Flyover” to locate tender documents, contracts, or appraisal reports, using filters for closed/cancelled contracts. On the CMA website, search “Isle of Wight ferry market” or “Solent ferry competition” for post-2009 correspondence or preliminary assessments. On Hansard, search “A1 cancellation”, “Moor Farm roundabout”, or “Scottish ferry procurement” for ministerial statements or debates. On LinkedIn, use advanced search for “construction firms North East England” or “shipbuilding UK” to identify affected firms, filtering by SIC codes (42110, 30110). On Meta Ads Manager, target Isle of Wight residents with keywords “ferry fares” or “Solent transport” to collect consumer impact statements via a campaign landing page. On X, search hashtags #A1Dualling or #IsleofWightFerries and engage with posts from local MPs or businesses to gather real-time sentiment and evidence. Use Hunter.io or Snov.io with company domains (e.g., balfourbeatty.com, wightlink.co.uk) to find contact emails for outreach to affected firms or operators.
To monetize as COCOO’s solicitor, I would charge fixed fees for drafting Judicial Review Pre-Action letters (e.g., Gateshead, potentially Moor Farm) and the CMA complaint, ensuring affordability. I would offer consultancy services to North East and Isle of Wight businesses, preparing impact assessments or tender reviews for fees, leveraging COCOO’s SIC 70229 and 80300 classifications. Mediation services for Gateshead and Isle of Wight disputes would be offered on a contingency basis, earning a percentage of settlement value if successful. Partnerships with trade associations (e.g., UK Chamber of Shipping, Construction Industry Council) could yield membership-based contracts for ongoing advocacy. I need COCOO to clarify its standing (direct harm or public interest) and provide primary analysis reports to assess evidence strength. Which cause of action should I prioritize, and does COCOO have specific evidence or prefer mediation over litigation?
FOREIGN DIMENSIONS
The most direct foreign involvement is in the Scottish ferry procurement. Our research confirms that the public body, Caledonian Maritime Assets Ltd, awarded the contract for seven new electric ferries to Remontowa Shipbuilding S.A., a major shipbuilding company based in Gdansk, Poland. Simultaneously, the contract for two new hybrid vessels for the Islay route was awarded to Cemre Marin Endustri, a shipyard in Yalova, Turkey. These two foreign companies are central participants in the procurement process we are scrutinising. The foreign parties affected by this are the unsuccessful bidders for these valuable contracts. While a full public list of bidders is not available, the European shipbuilding market is highly competitive, meaning that companies from other major shipbuilding nations such as Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands would have been likely competitors and can be considered commercially affected parties.
In the case of the Isle of Wight ferry market, the international dimension is one of ultimate ownership and control. The alleged perpetrators, the ferry operators, are controlled by foreign capital. Red Funnel is owned by a consortium that includes the Workplace Safety & Insurance Board of Ontario, Canada, and other international pension funds. Wightlink is co-owned by Fiera Infrastructure, a company based in Canada, and Basalt Infrastructure Partners, an international fund. This means that the profits generated from the alleged abuse of dominance in this UK market are flowing to foreign investors. Furthermore, the market is populated by potential foreign competitors who are affected by the high barriers to entry. These include major European ferry operators that are active in the wider UK market, such as DFDS of Denmark, Brittany Ferries of France, and Stena Line of Sweden. These companies are necessary collaborators in the sense that their potential to enter the market is a key factor in assessing its competitiveness.
Finally, while the infrastructure failures in the North East involve UK public bodies, the market for delivering these major projects is international. The UK construction sector includes major European players who regularly compete for government tenders. These include companies such as Vinci and Bouygues of France, Skanska of Sweden, and Strabag of Austria. These foreign firms are affected by the cancellation of projects like the A1 dualling, as it reduces the pool of available high-value contracts in the UK market. They would be necessary participants in any fair and competitive re-tendering process and have a direct interest in the integrity of the UK’s infrastructure procurement system.
FOIS
First, regarding the Isle of Wight ferry market, our research confirms there is no existing infringement finding that would allow for a simple follow-on claim. The most relevant decision is from the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), the predecessor to the CMA, which concluded a market study in October 2009. The OFT decided not to refer the market for a full investigation at that time. However, the report itself is exceptionally useful for our case. The OFT explicitly found that the market has features that “prevent, restrict or distort competition”. It identified significant barriers to entry for new competitors, primarily related to the physical limitations and control of harbour facilities. The only reason the OFT did not proceed was its view that there was “limited evidence of actual consumer detriment” at that specific time. This is a crucial finding for us. We can now argue that in the years since 2009, the predictable outcome of this uncompetitive market structure has been realised in the form of the excessive fares and poor service that are now evident. The 2009 OFT report provides the ideal foundation for a new complaint to the CMA, arguing that the conditions for consumer detriment have now been met and that a full investigation is required.
Second, in relation to our infrastructure causes of action, our search has uncovered a highly relevant and definitive Finding of Infringement in the wider construction sector. In March 2023, the Competition and Markets Authority issued an infringement decision, fining ten construction firms nearly £60 million for illegal bid-rigging on demolition and asbestos removal contracts. The illegal conduct included “cover bidding,” where firms agree to submit deliberately uncompetitive bids to create a false impression of competition. While this decision does not relate specifically to the A1 dualling project, it is powerful evidence that we can use. It proves that illegal cartels and bid-rigging are a real and recent phenomenon in the UK construction industry. This provides significant weight to our argument that the “poor value for money” assessment used to cancel the A1 project may have been based on unlawfully inflated bids. We can use this infringement finding to demand that National Highways disclose how it screened for bid-rigging in the A1 tender process. This finding strengthens both our grounds for Judicial Review and our unsolicited proposals to public bodies, highlighting a critical risk they must manage. We can point to the fact that follow-on claims for damages are already being launched against the perpetrators of this cartel as proof of the financial consequences.
Finally, for the Scottish ferry procurement, our research found no existing infringement findings related to bid-rigging in the UK shipbuilding sector or specific competition law rulings against CMAL’s procurement processes. This absence of findings confirms that, for this part of our case, there is no opportunity for a follow-on claim. This reinforces our initial strategy: our challenge to the Scottish procurement must be based on public law principles of irrationality and procedural impropriety, rather than on a breach of competition law. This allows us to focus our resources effectively, using a public interest and political campaign to highlight the potential failures in the procurement process, a known area of focus for the CMA in other sectors.
COAS
In the realm of tort law, which addresses civil wrongs causing harm, our most powerful cause of action against private sector entities lies in the statutory tort of breaching competition law. This is most clearly applicable to the private operators in the Isle of Wight ferry market. We have established a strong basis to allege an abuse of a collective dominant position. This tortious conduct manifests as excessive pricing and poor service, causing direct financial harm to a class of consumers and businesses. We can also explore a related tort of conspiracy if we uncover evidence that the operators have secretly colluded on their prices or schedules.
Against the public sector entities, our primary tort-based actions are in the specialised area of public law. We have a clear cause of action against the Department for Transport and National Highways for the tort of making an irrational public law decision in cancelling the A1 dualling project after significant expenditure. A similar cause of action exists against Gateshead Council for the tort of procedural impropriety in its failure to adequately consult on the demolition of the flyover. Furthermore, drawing on our wider research, we can pursue a more novel cause of action against the relevant regulators for the tort of negligence by omission, arguing that their persistent failure to intervene in the uncompetitive Isle of Wight ferry market is a breach of their statutory duty to protect consumers.
In contract law, our causes of action depend on the existence of a specific contractual relationship. Involving the public sector, a direct cause of action for breach of contract could be brought by any construction or consultancy firm whose agreement for the A1 project was terminated. They would argue that the termination was unlawful because it was based on an irrational decision by the public authority. Furthermore, we can argue that the public procurement contract between Caledonian Maritime Assets Ltd and the Polish shipyard is fundamentally unlawful. The cause of action here is that the contract is invalid because it is the product of a flawed and potentially irrational award process, rendering it voidable.
In the private sector, the primary cause of action relates to the contracts for carriage between the Isle of Wight ferry operators and their customers. While a journey is provided, we will argue that the price term within every one of these contracts is unlawful and therefore unenforceable. The cause of action is that the price is not the result of a competitive market but is a direct consequence of the tortious abuse of dominance, giving every customer a right to claim restitution for the overcharged amount. Should evidence of collusion emerge, the cause of action becomes even stronger: any contract based on a price-fixing agreement is automatically void, making the price term illegal from its inception.
I have analysed the new documents and will extract the key principles and evidence that will strengthen our position in the GROWTHUK case. The framework detailed in these files, which can be described as a Whistleblower, Public Interest, and Consumer Protection (WPI) strategy, provides a powerful lens through which to advance our three causes of action. This approach combines legal action, public campaigning, and strategic proposals to achieve our goals of compensation, deterrence, and regulatory reform
For our first cause of action, the infrastructure failures in the North East, the WPI framework provides a solid foundation for our planned Judicial Review against the public bodies involved2. The documents explicitly list the grounds we intend to use: irrationality, for a decision so unreasonable that no sensible authority would make it, and procedural impropriety3. The cancellation of the A1 dualling project after an expenditure of £68 million is a textbook example of a decision we can challenge as irrational4. Furthermore, the novel legal theory outlined in the ‘UK National Debt Tort Claim’ document, while legally ambitious, is a powerful tool for our media campaign5555. We can publicly frame the government’s actions not just as poor policy, but as a breach of its duty of care to taxpayers through the wasteful expenditure of public funds6666. The WPI case examples demonstrate a clear precedent for holding public bodies accountable for the harmful consequences of their flawed processes and omissions7777.
Regarding our second cause of action, the Scottish ferry procurement, the WPI materials directly support our challenge of a flawed public procurement process8888. The core of our argument is that the decision by Caledonian Maritime Assets Ltd to award major contracts overseas represents a failure in its public duty to secure best value and consider the wider economic impact9. The case examples confirm that where a public body makes a decision based on a flawed or irrational process, the resulting contract can be deemed unlawful10. While the time limits for a direct procurement challenge have passed, this principle provides strong backing for our media campaign and our unsolicited proposal to the Scottish Government. We will propose a review of their procurement framework to prevent future occurrences, positioning ourselves as experts seeking to prevent the very kind of procedural failures and harm the WPI strategy is designed to combat
Finally, for our third cause of action concerning the Isle of Wight ferry market, the new documents provide the most significant strategic enhancements. The document on duopoly and collective dominance is critical12. We can now frame the market not just as one of individual dominance, but of collective dominance, where the two main operators, through their parallel pricing and scheduling, effectively act as a single entity to the detriment of consumers13. This allows us to argue for an abuse of a collective dominant position, which can manifest as excessive pricing and the limiting of market access14. This is a more robust and accurate depiction of the market reality. Furthermore, the WPI framework provides a powerful new angle. We can argue that the relevant regulatory bodies have failed in their duty to prevent this consumer harm, constituting a tort of omission or a breach of their statutory duty151515. This allows us to target not only the private operators for their anti-competitive conduct but also the public regulators for their failure to act, which significantly broadens the scope and leverage of our case. This hybrid approach, targeting both corporate perpetrators and negligent public bodies, is the central tenet of the WPI strategy16.
The first and most severe ground for invalidity arises from anti-competitive agreements, or collusion. The legal documents on horizontal agreements confirm that under UK and EU competition law, any contract or concerted practice between competitors that has the object of restricting competition—such as fixing prices, sharing markets, or rigging bids—is automatically void. This principle could apply directly to our case in two significant ways. If we were to uncover evidence of collusion between the Isle of Wight ferry operators on pricing or service scheduling, any such agreement would be null and void. This would mean that the fare structures imposed on consumers and businesses are based on an illegal foundation. Even more compellingly, this principle casts a new light on the infrastructure projects. If the “poor value for money” assessment used to cancel the A1 dualling was based on bids from construction firms that were secretly colluding, then those bids and any resulting preliminary contracts would themselves be void as a matter of law. This would not only be a corporate tort but would also completely invalidate the government’s entire rationale for the cancellation.
The second ground for unlawfulness relates to the abuse of a dominant market position, which is a form of statutory tort. This is most relevant to the Isle of Wight ferry market. While a customer’s contract to travel on a ferry is not automatically void in its entirety, the terms of that contract can be deemed unlawful if they are the product of illegal exploitation. If, as we allege, the ferry operators are using a dominant position to charge excessive prices, then the price term within every contract for carriage is tainted by illegality. This does not invalidate the entire service, but it renders the exploitative price unlawful and gives every consumer and business a right to restitution for the amount they were overcharged. The contract is valid in that the journey takes place, but it is unlawful in that the price paid was extracted through an illegal abuse of market power.
The third ground for unlawfulness stems from the specific duties of public bodies, where a contract can be invalidated due to the misconduct of the contracting authority. This is particularly relevant for the Scottish ferry procurement and the A1 infrastructure contracts. A public body like Caledonian Maritime Assets Ltd or National Highways must act within its legal powers, a principle known as acting intra vires. If, in awarding the ferry contract to a Polish shipyard or in cancelling contracts for the A1 preparatory works, these bodies failed to follow mandatory procurement regulations, ignored relevant considerations, or acted on a basis that was legally irrational, their decision to enter into or terminate the contract is unlawful. This finding of ultra vires conduct, typically established through a Judicial Review, would taint the entire contractual arrangement. It could give the other contracting party grounds to sue the public body for damages, or, if caught in time, could lead to a court quashing the unlawful contract award itself.
PS
Of course. To refine our strategy, it is essential to move from general causes of action to the specific products and services that are the subject matter of our case. A precise understanding of these will allow us to more accurately identify affected consumer types and relevant competitors. I will detail these for each of the three core pillars of the GROWTHUK case.
The first pillar of our case concerns the failures in public infrastructure management by bodies such as the Department for Transport, National Highways, and Gateshead Council. The “service” at the heart of this cause of action is the strategic planning, project management, and delivery of key road network infrastructure1. The specific “products” that have failed to be delivered or are being mismanaged are the A1 dualling project between Morpeth and Ellingham 2, the planned upgrades to the A19 Moor Farm and Seaton Burn junctions 3, and the physical maintenance and future viability of the Gateshead Flyover4444. By defining the product so precisely, we can refine our search for affected parties. The “consumers” of this service are not just private motorists but also commercial road users, specifically the road freight and logistics industry, whose business models depend on the efficiency of these exact routes. Competitors in this context are the major civil engineering and construction firms who compete to deliver these multi-million-pound projects and who suffer direct financial harm when they are abruptly cancelled5.
The second pillar relates to the public procurement of maritime assets by Caledonian Maritime Assets Ltd (CMAL) and the Scottish Government. The specific “products” that are the subject of our scrutiny are the contracts for the construction of two new Islay-class ferries and up to seven new electric vessels for the Small Vessel Replacement Programme6666666. The “service” under examination is the public procurement and contract management service provided by CMAL7777. We allege this service has been performed in a manner that represents poor value for money and has failed to adequately support the domestic industrial base. This detailed focus allows us to identify direct competitors with precision: they are the UK and European shipyards that were shortlisted for these contracts but were ultimately unsuccessful8. The consumers are twofold: the direct customer is the Scottish taxpayer, and the end-users are the residents and businesses of the Scottish islands who depend on these lifeline ferry services for their economic survival9.
The third pillar, concerning the Isle of Wight ferry market, involves the most conventional products and services. The services that are the subject of our potential abuse of dominance action are vehicle ferry services and foot passenger ferry services operating on the routes across the Solent10. Our action is not just about the provision of this service, but specifically about its price, quality, and the conditions under which it is offered. This includes the operators’ fare structures and pricing levels 11111111, the frequency and reliability of the service 12121212, and their control over essential port infrastructure, which acts as a barrier to entry for potential competitors13131313. This specificity allows us to segment the affected consumer types very effectively into commercial users, such as tourism and construction businesses on the island, and individual consumers, such as commuters and holidaymakers. It also helps us refine our search for competitors to other operators of high-frequency, short-sea vehicle and passenger ferry routes in the UK and Europe who might have the operational expertise to enter the market if the structural barriers were removed.
CASELEX
The first cause of action concerns the infrastructure failures in the North East of England. The industries most directly affected are those in the Construction sector, classified under SIC Section F, particularly companies involved in the ‘Construction of roads and motorways’ (SIC 42110) and ‘Construction of bridges and tunnels’ (SIC 42120). These are the firms that would have bid on or been awarded contracts for the A1 dualling or the Gateshead Flyover. They have suffered direct financial losses related to tender preparation, resource allocation, and cancelled contracts. The probability of these specific firms succeeding in a legal claim is high, but only if they had a direct contract that was subsequently breached. For those who merely tendered, success is unlikely. However, their appetite to join our media campaign is very high, as public pressure is their most effective tool to have the projects reinstated.
The indirect negative spillovers from these infrastructure failures are far broader, impacting the entire regional economy. The Transportation and Storage industry (SIC Section H), especially ‘Freight transport by road’ (SIC 49410), suffers from increased operational costs and reduced efficiency, directly impacting their profitability. The Wholesale and Retail Trade (SIC Section G) and the region’s Manufacturing base (SIC Section C) are similarly harmed through less reliable and more expensive supply chains. While the direct financial harm to any single one of these businesses is difficult to isolate and prove in court, making the probability of success in a legal claim for pure economic loss very low, their collective interest is enormous. This makes them exceptionally strong candidates for our media campaign. Their unified voice, complaining of being held back by a lack of government investment in infrastructure, is a powerful narrative for achieving our political objectives.
The second cause of action, the flawed Scottish ferry procurement, primarily impacts the UK’s Shipbuilding and Repair industry (SIC 30110). The directly harmed parties are the UK shipyards and their extensive supply chains in marine engineering and steel manufacturing who lost out on the procurement bids. Their legal recourse is almost non-existent now, as the strict 30-day time limit for challenging a procurement decision has long passed. Therefore, the probability of success in any legal claim is virtually zero. However, the probability of these companies and associated trade unions wanting to join our media campaign is extremely high. The narrative of public funds being spent overseas while skilled UK jobs are at risk is politically potent and aligns perfectly with their commercial and industrial interests.
Finally, the third cause of action, the alleged abuse of dominance in the Isle of Wight ferry market, presents the clearest case for collective legal and media action. The harm here is direct and felt across almost every sector of the island’s economy. The primary victims are the Accommodation and Food Service Activities (SIC Section I) and Wholesale and Retail Trade (SIC Section G), which form the backbone of the island’s tourism-led economy. They suffer a double harm: higher costs for all their incoming supplies and suppressed demand from tourists deterred by high travel prices. The island’s Agriculture (SIC Section A) and Construction (SIC Section F) sectors are also directly harmed by inflated transport costs for their materials and produce.
For these island-based industries, the probability of success in a collective legal claim is high. The harm is uniform and quantifiable, making it an ideal scenario for an opt-out collective action claim at the Competition Appeal Tribunal, as discussed. The strong legal position and the significant potential financial recovery mean that a mediated settlement with the ferry operators is also a highly probable outcome, as they will wish to avoid the precedent and cost of a lost legal case. Consequently, the willingness of these businesses to join our media campaign is assured. They are the face of the harm we are seeking to remedy, and their stories will be the most powerful tool in our public advocacy and in pressuring the ferry operators to negotiate.
First, to fortify our media campaign, these cases provide clear, relatable examples that will help the public and press understand the complex issues at the heart of our case. For the Isle of Wight ferry situation, we can now draw a direct and easily understood parallel with the airline industry. The case files on airline alliances and joint ventures highlight how collaboration between a few dominant players on specific routes leads to higher prices and less choice for consumers. We will use this in our media narrative: just as a lack of competition on the London to Madrid flight route harms air travellers, the dominance of a few operators on the Solent crossing harms islanders and businesses. It frames the issue not as a local peculiarity, but as a classic competition problem. Furthermore, the case concerning the cloud computing market gives us the perfect analogy for the ferry operators’ control of port infrastructure. We can explain that control of essential ports acts as a barrier to new competitors, just as the technical ‘lock-in’ and high data ‘egress fees’ used by tech giants prevent customers from switching cloud providers.
Second, these precedents significantly sharpen our unsolicited proposals to public bodies and private companies. When we approach the Department for Transport and National Highways regarding the infrastructure failures, we can now add a new layer of expert analysis. Our proposal will not only address the irrationality of their decision-making but will also warn them of the inherent risk of cartel behaviour within their construction supply chains. The case files on cartels in car manufacturing, chemicals, and computer components demonstrate that collusion on pricing and bids is a pervasive threat in complex industrial projects. We can use this evidence to propose a new service for them: a review of their procurement processes to screen for and mitigate the risk of bid-rigging, thereby protecting taxpayer money. This reframes our engagement from purely critical to constructively expert. Similarly, our submission to the CMA regarding the Isle of Wight ferries will be strengthened by citing the legal reasoning used against Amazon in the e-books market and Qualcomm in the chipset market. We will show that the ferry operators’ conduct is a textbook example of the abuse of dominance that regulators are increasingly challenging and penalising in other sectors.
Third, and perhaps most critically, these findings provide us with significant leverage for mediation. Understanding the legal and commercial risks that our targets face is the key to any successful negotiation. When engaging with public bodies like CMAL regarding the Scottish ferry procurement, we can subtly change our posture. Rather than solely being a critic of their procurement outcome, we can approach them as a potential ally, helping them understand their risk of being a victim of anti-competitive behaviour by bidders, using the car manufacturers’ damages claims against the air-conditioning cartel as a stark example. For the private ferry operators on the Isle of Wight, the strategic environment has shifted. The sheer volume of successful regulatory interventions and massive collective claims against dominant platforms, as seen in the files on cloud computing, e-books, and chipsets, demonstrates a clear trend. In any mediation, we can now forcefully argue that their business model is legally precarious and that regulatory action is no longer a remote possibility but a probable outcome. This reality makes a negotiated settlement that improves service and lowers fares a far more rational and commercially prudent option for them than facing a lengthy and costly CMA investigation followed by a collective damages claim.
By weaving these precedents into our existing strategy, we elevate the GROWTHUK case. It is no longer just about a cancelled road and some expensive ferries; it becomes a case study of the key competition challenges facing the UK economy, from tackling private monopolies and cartels to ensuring public bodies are effective and efficient guardians of the public purse.
INDUSTRY CODES
Based on the nature of our GROWTHUK case, we can divide our analysis into two primary areas: first, the transport infrastructure sector, which encompasses the A1, Moor Farm, and Gateshead Flyover issues; and second, the maritime transport and shipbuilding sector, which covers both the Scottish and Isle of Wight ferry matters.
In the realm of transport infrastructure, the principal defendants are public bodies: the Department for Transport, National Highways, and Gateshead Council. However, these bodies operate through a network of private sector engineering, construction, and consultancy firms. These firms are both potential collaborators in the flawed projects and potential claimants who may have lost out on tenders or had contracts cancelled. Using the classification documents, this sector is defined by codes such as SIC Section F for Construction, specifically code 42110 for the ‘Construction of roads and motorways’, and NACE code F42.11, which corresponds directly. The ICB framework classifies these activities under the Industrials Supersector, within the Construction and Materials sector.
By cross-referencing these classifications with the provided list of ISIN codes for publicly traded companies, we can identify major UK players in this space. For example, we find companies like Balfour Beatty PLC, Kier Group PLC, and Morgan Sindall Group PLC. These are precisely the types of firms that would bid for and execute major projects like the A1 dualling. Their horizontal competitors, both in the UK and Europe, would operate under the same classification codes. Identifying these entities is crucial; they may possess key evidence about the tendering and assessment process, and those who lost bids for the A1 project could be considered parties harmed by any procedural irregularities. The claimant class also includes the entire population of businesses in the North East of England and South East Scotland reliant on this arterial route for logistics and trade, falling under a vast range of SIC codes from manufacturing and retail to professional services.
Turning to the maritime transport and shipbuilding sector, the issues are twofold. For the Scottish ferry procurement, our focus is on shipbuilding and public procurement. This industry is classified under SIC code 30110 for ‘Building of ships and floating structures’ and NACE code C30.11. The ICB would place this under Industrials. Our potential claimants here are the UK and European shipyards that were unsuccessful in the bidding process won by the Polish firm. Reviewing the list of publicly traded industrial and engineering firms, we can identify entities like Babcock International Group PLC and BAE Systems PLC, which possess heavy engineering and shipbuilding capabilities. These companies and their smaller, privately-owned competitors represent a key group of stakeholders potentially harmed by a flawed procurement process.
The situation with the Isle of Wight ferries involves the market for ‘Sea and coastal passenger water transport’, corresponding to SIC code 50100 and ICB subsector 50201010, Marine Transportation. The defendants are the private operators. The potential claimant class is clearly defined: the residents and businesses of the Isle of Wight. This includes every business in the tourism sector (SIC Section I, Accommodation and Food Service Activities), retail sector (SIC Section G), and all other island-based enterprises that suffer financially from what we allege are excessively high transport costs. Furthermore, horizontal competitors in the European ferry market, such as Irish Continental Group PLC or other major transport and logistics companies, are interested parties. They are potential market entrants who are currently deterred by the high barriers to entry that protect the incumbent operators. These are the very companies who might consider launching a competing service if our actions are successful in making the market more competitive.
Regarding the specific request for email addresses, the provided data files do not contain this information. The lists of ISIN and industry codes are for classification and identification of corporate entities, not for contact details. The next operational phase, once we have refined our target list of companies from this analysis, will be to undertake a systematic effort to obtain appropriate contact points through public records, company websites, and engagement with relevant industry and trade associations. This will allow us to reach out to potential allies, gather evidence, and inform harmed parties of their potential role in our collective actions.
I have processed the five new attachments related to the GROWTHUK case, extracting insights, evidence, and strategies to strengthen COCOO’s position, identify filings to search for, and facilitate assigning or selling the case before legal action. Below, I detail the extractions from each attachment, their relevance to the case, and why they are critical. I then provide a draft mediation agreement tailored to the GROWTHUK case, focusing on the Isle of Wight ferry market and Gateshead Flyover disputes, as these offer the strongest mediation potential. Finally, I outline strategies for evidence gathering and case monetization.
From the document titled “HOW 2 SELL MY LITIGATION, USP AND MEDIATION PROJECTS.txt,” the key extraction is the detailed landscape of firms that purchase legal claims, arbitration awards, and pre-litigation opportunities, distinguishing outright purchase from traditional litigation funding. Firms like Fortress Investment Group, Harbour Litigation Funding, Certum Group, and Bench Walk Advisors explicitly offer outright purchase of claims, judgments, or insolvency assets, providing immediate liquidity and risk transfer. Fortress’s Legal Assets unit, with over $6.8 billion committed, targets judgments and awards, while Harbour offers claim acquisition for corporates and insolvency practitioners. Certum specializes in purchasing litigation-contingent assets like IP rights, and Bench Walk buys single awards and insolvency claims. Burford Capital and Omni Bridgeway, though primarily funders, engage in large-scale monetization resembling purchases. The document also highlights pre-litigation investment through funding investigations, portfolio financing, or acquiring assets like patents, with firms like AlphaLit originating investible claims. This is critical because it identifies potential buyers (e.g., Fortress, Harbour) for COCOO’s claims, particularly the Isle of Wight collective action or Gateshead-related claims, allowing monetization before litigation. It also suggests structuring pre-litigation investigations (e.g., for A1 or Scottish ferries) as portfolio financing to attract funders, enhancing case value. Relevant filings to search include SEC filings for Fortress and Burford (via sec.gov) for transaction details, and UK Companies House records for Harbour and Bench Walk to verify financial capacity. The document’s emphasis on secondary markets (e.g., Omni’s Ares deal) suggests COCOO could package claims for sale to institutional investors, increasing marketability.
From the first untitled attachment, key extractions include the WPI strategy, which combines legal action, public campaigning, and unsolicited proposals to achieve compensation and reform. It confirms Judicial Review grounds (irrationality, procedural impropriety) for the A1 cancellation and Gateshead Flyover, supported by the £68 million wasted on A1 as evidence of irrationality. For Scottish ferries, it emphasizes procurement flaws, proposing a media campaign to pressure CMAL for reform. The Isle of Wight section strengthens the collective dominance argument, targeting both operators (Red Funnel, Wightlink) and regulators for negligence by omission. This is vital because it provides a multi-pronged strategy, allowing COCOO to pursue mediation or litigation while leveraging public pressure. The collective dominance theory enhances the Isle of Wight case’s viability for a Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) claim. Relevant filings include CMA complaints or market study reports (via gov.uk) for Isle of Wight ferries and procurement records from CMAL (via publiccontractsscotland.gov.uk) for ferry contracts.
The second untitled attachment, detailing campaign phases and compensation projects, extracts the structured media campaign (Narrative Crystallisation, Dossier Assembly, Leverage and Action Loop) to frame GROWTHUK as a national economic issue. It identifies specific victims (North East businesses, Isle of Wight residents, UK shipbuilders) and perpetrators (DfT, CMAL, ferry operators), proposing targeted outreach via LinkedIn, Meta, and X to gather claimants. The compensation campaign for Isle of Wight residents and businesses is critical, as it outlines a collective action for overcharges, supported by a digital registration portal. For A1 and Gateshead, it suggests negligence or nuisance claims for physical harm or disruption. This is relevant because it provides a blueprint for building claimant classes and public support, increasing pressure for mediation. Filings to search include FOI responses from DfT/National Highways (via whatdotheyknow.com) for A1 appraisal data and Gateshead Council’s consultation records for the flyover.
The third untitled attachment, focusing on public contract projects, extracts the strategy of targeting businesses harmed by A1 cancellation or Scottish ferry procurement, offering legal support for claims. It identifies UK Tenders opportunities, such as the Crown Commercial Service’s Management Consultancy Framework and the Public Sector Research and Insights DPS, to secure contracts for procurement reform or market studies. The Economic Advisory Services tender aligns with A1 appraisal critiques. This is crucial because it offers a revenue stream through consultancy contracts, enhancing COCOO’s financial position while building case credibility. Filings to search include tender submissions and contract awards on Contracts Finder (contractsfinder.service.gov.uk) and Find a Tender (find-tender.service.gov.uk) for A1 and ferry-related projects.
The fourth untitled attachment, labeled “CONTACTS,” extracts specific corporate details for key players: Balfour Beatty, Kier Group, and Vinci for A1/Gateshead; Remontowa and Cemre for Scottish ferries; and Wightlink and Red Funnel for Isle of Wight. It confirms the claimant class as North East businesses, Isle of Wight residents, and UK shipyards like Babcock and BAE Systems. This is essential for targeted outreach to build claimant groups or mediation participants. Filings to search include Companies House records for UK firms (via find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk) for financial health and directorships, and Polish/Turkish commercial registries for Remontowa/Cemre contract details.
To assign or sell the case, I would package the Isle of Wight collective action as a high-value claim for sale to Fortress or Harbour, emphasizing the 2009 OFT report and current consumer detriment evidence for a strong CAT case. For Gateshead, I would pitch a Judicial Review claim to Certum or Bench Walk, highlighting the procedural impropriety angle and potential settlement value. Pre-litigation investigations for A1 and Scottish ferries could be bundled into a portfolio financing deal with Burford or Omni, diversifying risk. Search strategies include: on sec.gov, query “Fortress Investment Group legal assets” or “Burford Capital monetization” for transaction precedents; on Companies House, search firm names for annual reports; on Contracts Finder, search “A1 dualling” or “ferry procurement” for tender documents; on X, use hashtags #IsleofWightFerries or #A1Dualling to identify stakeholder complaints; on LinkedIn, target construction/shipbuilding firms with SIC 42110/30110 for claimant outreach.
**Draft Mediation Agreement for GROWTHUK Case**
**MEDIATION AGREEMENT**
This Mediation Agreement (“Agreement”) is entered into on [Date] between COCOO.uk (“Mediator”), a non-profit organization registered at [Address], and the Parties: (1) Wightlink Limited, registered at Gunwharf Road, Portsmouth, Hampshire, PO1 2LA, and Red Funnel Group, registered at 12 Bugle Street, Southampton, Hampshire, SO14 2JY (collectively, “Ferry Operators”); (2) Gateshead Council, registered at Civic Centre, Regent Street, Gateshead, NE8 1HH (“Council”); (3) Representative Claimants, comprising Isle of Wight businesses and residents (represented by [Named Representative, e.g., Isle of Wight Chamber of Commerce]) and North East businesses affected by the Gateshead Flyover demolition (represented by [Named Representative, e.g., North East Chamber of Commerce]) (“Claimants”).
**Purpose**
The Parties agree to engage in confidential, non-binding mediation facilitated by COCOO.uk to resolve disputes concerning: (a) alleged abuse of collective dominant position by the Ferry Operators through excessive pricing and poor service in the Isle of Wight ferry market; and (b) alleged procedural impropriety and irrationality by the Council in deciding to demolish the Gateshead Flyover. The mediation aims to avoid litigation, including a potential Competition Appeal Tribunal claim and Judicial Review, by achieving a mutually beneficial settlement.
**Mediation Process**
1. COCOO.uk shall act as a neutral mediator, facilitating discussions without advocating for any Party.
2. The mediation shall commence within 14 days of signing and consist of: (a) initial written submissions from each Party outlining positions and desired outcomes; (b) separate caucuses with the Mediator to identify core interests; and (c) joint sessions to negotiate terms.
3. The process shall conclude within 60 days unless extended by mutual consent.
4. All discussions and documents shared during mediation are confidential and inadmissible in any legal proceedings, except as required by law.
**Proposed Settlement Framework**
For the Ferry Operators: The Parties shall negotiate a Solent Fair Fares Charter, establishing a transparent pricing formula (e.g., capped fare increases tied to inflation) and minimum service reliability standards (e.g., 95% on-time performance). Claimants may agree to forgo demands for historical financial data in exchange for these commitments.
For the Council: The Parties shall negotiate a revised decision-making process for the Gateshead Flyover, including a public options appraisal comparing demolition and refurbishment, and compensation for affected businesses (e.g., temporary rate relief). Claimants may agree to forgo Judicial Review in exchange for these commitments.
**Obligations**
1. The Parties shall participate in good faith, providing relevant documents (e.g., fare data, AECOM report) as requested by the Mediator.
2. The Ferry Operators and Council agree to consider interim measures (e.g., fare freezes, delayed demolition) during mediation.
3. COCOO.uk shall maintain impartiality and confidentiality, disclosing no conflicts of interest.
**Costs**
Each Party shall bear its own costs. COCOO.uk’s mediation services are provided pro bono, though Parties may agree to share administrative expenses (e.g., venue costs).
**Binding Outcome**
Any settlement reached shall be documented in a legally binding agreement, enforceable under English law. If no settlement is reached, Parties may pursue litigation without prejudice.
**Governing Law**
This Agreement is governed by English law, with disputes resolved by the courts of England and Wales.
**Signatures**
[Space for signatures of COCOO.uk, Ferry Operators, Council, and Claimant Representatives]
This agreement leverages COCOO’s neutral role to facilitate settlements, addressing the Isle of Wight’s economic harm and Gateshead’s community impact while avoiding costly litigation. COCOO should clarify preferred causes of action and provide primary evidence to finalize the mediation scope.
COMMONALITIES
Understood. My apologies for the misunderstanding. Our focus is the unified ‘GROWTHUK’ case, which is comprised of the matters detailed in our initial letters and the overarching strategy outlined in our Preliminary Report. We will now apply the legal principles and strategic frameworks detailed in the documents concerning the UK constitution and collective claims specifically to the core issues of our GROWTHUK case.
Our strategy must be two-pronged, using distinct legal tools to tackle the different facets of the economic harm we have identified. The documents on collective claims provide a powerful framework for addressing the corporate and market failures harming consumers, while the constitutional analysis informs our approach to challenging the failures of public bodies.
First, let us apply the collective action framework to the GROWTHUK case. The most direct and compelling application relates to the Isle of Wight ferry market1. The documents on ongoing competition claims are replete with examples of collective actions targeting businesses that abuse a dominant market position to inflict financial harm on a captive customer base222222222. The situation on the Isle of Wight, with its perceived high fares and lack of competition, mirrors the core allegations in cases like the one brought against BT for allegedly overcharging its standalone landline customers 3333 or the water companies for allegedly inflating bills4.
Here, we can identify the essential ‘commonality’ required for a collective claim. The ‘class’ would be all consumers and businesses on the Isle of Wight who rely on the ferry services. The ‘common harm’ is the direct and repeated financial loss suffered due to the allegedly excessive prices charged by the operators, which is a harm made possible by the market’s structure that restricts competition5. The documents relating to the BSV Claims case provide a clear operational template6666. While we, as COCOO, would not be the class representative, our role is to catalyse this action. Our strategy should be to compile a formal, evidence-based complaint to the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), as we have already initiated7777. We will argue that the market conditions and consumer detriment warrant a full market investigation, which could establish an infringement decision8. Such a decision would then pave the way for a much simpler “follow-on” collective action to be brought by a dedicated class representative to recover damages for all islanders
Second, we must apply the constitutional principles to our challenges against public bodies. The document on the UK Constitution clarifies the foundational doctrines that shape our legal strategy for the infrastructure failures in the North East. The principle of the Separation of Powers, which assigns distinct roles to the judiciary, the executive, and the legislature, is paramount101010101010101010. Our Judicial Review claims against the Department for Transport, National Highways, and Gateshead Council are not an attempt to ask the courts to make policy decisions; that is the role of the executive and Parliament
Instead, our challenges are grounded in the judiciary’s constitutional function to uphold the rule of law and ensure that public bodies act lawfully and rationally within the powers granted to them by Parliament12121212. When we challenge the cancellation of the A1 dualling project on the grounds of irrationality, we are not asking the court to approve the road; we are asking it to rule that a decision to waste £68 million of public funds based on a secret “value for money” assessment is one that no reasonable authority could have made13131313. This is a question of law and process, which is firmly within the judiciary’s remit. Similarly, our challenge to the Gateshead Flyover demolition is based on an alleged failure to follow proper procedure, specifically regarding consultation with affected businesses, which is a breach of the rules of procedural fairness that the courts are duty-bound to enforce
The doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty sets the boundaries of our action15. We cannot ask a court to strike down the legislation that gives these public bodies their powers16. We can only challenge how those powers have been exercised. This principle also alerts us to a key risk: even if a decision is quashed by a court, Parliament could theoretically pass new legislation to authorise the same outcome17. This underscores why our legal actions must be combined with political and public engagement to ensure that a victory in court is not undone by a subsequent political manoeuvre. In essence, the ‘GROWTHUK’ case leverages these two frameworks. We will use the collective action model, as exemplified in the competition law documents, to confront the market failures like those seen in the Isle of Wight. Simultaneously, we will use the constitutional principles of lawful and rational public administration as the basis for our Judicial Review actions against the governmental failures that have stalled vital infrastructure projects. Both streams of work target the same ultimate problem—the brakes being placed on economic growth—but use the correct, constitutionally appropriate tools for each specific challenge.
GEMINI’S STRATEGY
Following our preliminary analysis, it is now time to operationalise our strategy. The letters we have dispatched are the opening salvo in a multi-front campaign to address the systemic issues identified. Our mission is to leverage the law to protect consumers, ensure fair competition, and hold public bodies accountable. This requires a focused, pragmatic approach, pursuing legal action where viable while simultaneously advancing our cause through regulatory and political channels. We will proceed by dissecting the distinct legal pathways available to us: Public Law, Competition Law, and the private law realms of Tort and Contract.
Our primary instrument for challenging the decisions of public bodies like government departments and local councils is Judicial Review. This is not a challenge on the political merits of a decision, but a disciplined legal examination of the decision-making process itself. We will argue that several recent decisions are unlawful due to irrationality and procedural impropriety.
The most urgent case is the demolition of the Gateshead Flyover. The council’s decision, taken in March 2025, presents a time-critical window for challenge which may be as short as six weeks, meaning our deadline is imminent. We must act immediately. Our challenge will be founded on two main grounds. Firstly, Procedural Impropriety, arguing that the consultation with local businesses and stakeholders who depend on the flyover was manifestly inadequate. Secondly, Irrationality, asserting that no reasonable council, having properly considered all relevant factors, would decide on demolition without making a full, public, and robust options appraisal comparing it against refurbishment, particularly given the profound economic impact on the town centre. We must immediately issue a Pre-Action Protocol letter to Gateshead Council, putting them on notice of our intended claim and demanding full disclosure of the engineering and economic reports that underpinned their decision.
Similarly, the decisions surrounding the A1 dualling cancellation and the potential cancellation of the Moor Farm roundabout upgrades by National Highways and the Department for Transport are ripe for challenge on the grounds of Irrationality. To cancel the A1 project after £68 million of public money has been spent, citing a “poor value for money” assessment that has not been made public, is arguably a perverse decision. While the three-month time limit for the A1 cancellation itself has likely passed, the same flawed logic is now being applied to Moor Farm. We must monitor this closely and, the moment a final negative decision is confirmed, we will launch a Judicial Review. The legal question will be whether the “value for money” assessment was itself lawful, and whether it properly accounted for strategic economic benefits and the waste of sunk costs. Freedom of Information requests for the full, unredacted business cases for these projects are an essential next step.
Regarding the Isle of Wight ferry services, our strategy shifts from the courts of law to the key regulator, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). The situation presents a classic potential case of Abuse of a Dominant Position under the Competition Act 1998. The ferry operators, functioning in a market with exceptionally high barriers to entry, appear to hold a dominant position. We will argue that this dominance is being abused through excessively high fares and poor service levels, conduct that a company facing effective competition could not sustain. Our next step is to consolidate the widespread public concern into a single, comprehensive and evidence-based complaint to the CMA. We will gather data on fare histories, service reliability, and conduct comparative analysis with other, more competitive ferry routes. Our complaint will formally request that the CMA launch a full market investigation, which has the power to impose remedies as significant as pricing controls or even structural changes to improve competition.
Finally, we must consider the avenues of Tort and Contract Law, which offer remedies for specific parties who have suffered direct harm. These are not tools for broad policy change, but for securing compensation for specific wrongs. Under Tort Law, businesses adjacent to the Gateshead Flyover, for instance, could have a potential claim in Private Nuisance for the disruption caused by extended demolition works if those works are carried out unreasonably. We must be clear, however, that a claim in Negligence against the government for pure economic loss resulting from a policy decision, such as the A1 cancellation, is exceptionally difficult to win. The courts are reluctant to impose a duty of care on public bodies for such financial losses. Our role here will be to advise and support groups of claimants who have suffered direct physical damage or a level of nuisance that is legally actionable.
For Contract Law, our path forward is to act as a facilitator. If any business had a direct contract with National Highways or its contractors to supply goods or services for the A1 project, the cancellation may constitute a breach of that contract. They could have a claim for damages. We will reach out to local business networks to identify any such parties, review their contracts, and assess the viability of a claim. We will pay particular attention to any exclusion or limitation clauses, which may be challengeable under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, especially where a public body has used its superior bargaining power to impose unreasonable terms.
This coordinated strategy of targeted legal challenges, a formal regulatory complaint, and support for private claims creates multiple points of pressure. The risks, particularly in terms of legal costs and uncertain outcomes, are significant. However, the potential for consumer detriment and economic damage from these actions is so great that we have a duty to act. We will proceed with urgency and diligence on all fronts.